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Abstract  
This paper provides causally plausible estimates of the effects of consumption 
taxes in a service sector on prices and demand for restaurant services. We utilize 
a large VAT reform affecting restaurant meals, where the VAT rate was cut from 
22% to 13% in 2010 in Finland. By comparing with restaurants in neighboring 
countries and other related sectors in Finland, the reform offers a natural 
experimental approach. The results indicate that restaurants reduced their prices 
on average by only 2%, which equals roughly a quarter of the full pass-through. 
Remarkably, at the same time a majority of restaurants did not reduce their prices 
at all and a non-trivial fraction of restaurants reduced their prices by exactly the 
full pass-through. Larger restaurants reduced their prices more often than smaller 
restaurants. We do not observe any increases in the quantity of services sold or in 
wage sums paid to employees. Furthermore, there are no changes in medium-
term entry and exit due to the reform. 
Key words: VAT reform, restaurants, tax incidence 
JEL classification numbers: H21, H22, H32 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan kulutusverotuksen vaikutuksia työvaltaisten 
palvelualojen hintoihin, kysyntään ja työllisyyteen. Tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään 
ravintoloiden arvonlisäveroalennusta vuoden 2010 heinäkuussa, jolloin 
ravintoloissa tarjottujen ruoka-annosten verokanta laski 22 prosentista 13 
prosenttiin Suomessa. Ravintola-alaa vertaillaan hotelleihin Suomessa ja 
ravintoloihin naapurimaissa. Tulosten perusteella arvonlisäveroalennus laski 
kuluttajahintoja keskimäärin noin 2 prosenttia. Jos veromuutos olisi alentanut 
kuluttajahintoja täysimääräisesti, lasku olisi ollut 7,4 prosenttia. Keskimääräinen 
hintavaikutus oli siis vain noin neljäsosa täydestä hintavaikutuksesta. Liike-
vaihdolla painotettu keskimääräinen hintavaikutus oli suurempi, mutta kuitenkin 
reilusti alhaisempi kuin täysi hintavaikutus. Suurempi painotettu hintavaikutus 
tarkoittaa sitä, että suuremmat ravintolat laskivat kuluttajahintojaan keskimäärin 
  
 
enemmän kuin pienemmät ravintolat. Tulokset osoittavat myös, että hyvin monet 
ravintolat eivät laskeneet hintojaan lainkaan veromuutoksen jälkeen ja useat 
ravintolat, jotka muuttivat hintoja, alensivat niitä tarkalleen 7,4 prosentilla. 
Ravintola-annosten myyntimäärässä ei havaita kasvua veromuutoksen jälkeen, 
joten ravintolapalveluiden kysyntä vaikuttaa olevan hyvin jäykkää. Lisäksi 
tulosten perusteella voidaan päätellä, että myöskään työllisyys alalla ei kasvanut. 
Johtopäätöksenä voi siis todeta, että arvonlisäverokantojen alennukset työ-
valtaisille palvelualoille eivät ole tehokas keino lisäämään taloudellista 
aktiivisuutta. 
Asiasanat: ALV-alennus, ravintolat, verokohtaanto 
JEL-luokittelu: H21, H22, H32 
 
1 Introdution
Internationally, the share of onsumption taxes of total tax revenue seems
to be inreasing all the time. Governments have also tried to support spe-
i setors through redued onsumption tax rates aiming to reate jobs
in these setors. Despite the vast theory literature
1
, there is only a narrow
empirial literature redibly examining the eets of onsumption taxes on
pries and quantities (Carbonnier (2007), Doyle and Samphantharak (2008),
Kosonen (2010), Marion and Muehlegger (2011)). Many studies fous solely
on prie inidene. However, prie responses are not suient statistis for
more thorough eieny analysis. It is more important to know the demand
elastiity of a good or servie.
This study aims to produe poliy-relevant statistis on the eieny of
onsumption taxation by analyzing a value added tax (VAT) reform aeting
restaurants in Finland. The VAT for restaurant meals was ut from the
standard rate of 22% to the redued rate of 13% in July 2010. We utilize
this poliy hange to investigate the eets of onsumption taxes on pries,
demand for restaurant servies and wage sums paid to employees. The results
oer insights into the eetiveness of onsumption taxes in labor-intensive
setors.
We apply a dierene-in-dierenes (DD) approah. Restaurant meals
in Finland in the treatment group are ompared against multiple ontrol
groups. This improves the robustness of the results. The ontrol groups
are hotel servies in Finland, and restaurant meals in Estonia, Norway and
Sweden. In the demand and wage sum estimations we use only hotels in
Finland as a omparison group due to data limitations.
The identifying assumption in the DD approah is that a ontrol group
should behave similarly to a treatment group without faing a treatment. In
the urrent setting this assumption is likely to be fullled, sine we ompare
the same setors in neighboring ountries with a similar limate and ulture.
Moreover, hotels and restaurants are losely related setors and resemble eah
other. Empirial support for the assumption that these groups resemble
eah other is provided by the similar long-term development of restaurant
meal pries in the ountries we ompare, and in turnover and wage sum
development in the two setors we ompare. The reform is exogenous to the
behavior of rms, sine it was made possible by European Union-level rules
1
E.g. Ramsey (1927), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Myles (1989).
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shortly before the Finnish VAT ut. It also seems that restaurants did not
antiipate the VAT ut by altering their pries prior to the reform.
Our prie data ome from a self-designed survey. The survey is for a ran-
dom sample of restaurants and hotels in Finland and restaurants in Estonia.
Pries were olleted from the websites of the rms in the sample, or if this
was not possible, by phone. The data inludes the prie of the same meal
in the same restaurant and the prie of the same room in the same hotel
before and after the reform. Thus the prie information allows us to follow
the development of pries of individual servies. By looking at the relative
hange of all servies, we are able to desribe the whole distribution of prie
hanges, rarely possible in the previous literature. In addition, we estimate
the average prie response with meal-level xed-eets, whih gives us high
preision. The survey ontains information about interesting predetermined
harateristis of rms, allowing us to divide the results by them. For robust-
ness we use restaurant meal prie data from Norway and Sweden originating
from data olleted for the onstrution of onsumer prie indies.
Additional interest in this paper lies in the impat of the reform on the
demand for restaurant servies and wage sums. For this we have a monthly
and annual level tax register data. On monthly level we have information
about turnover, whih is the onsumer prie value of servies sold, and the
wage sums of eah rm. Comparing the development of pries and turnover
of the same rms in the treatment and ontrol groups over the reform period
allows to estimate the impat of the reform on the quantities of servies sold.
The development of wage bills in the two groups over the reform period gives
an indiation of whether there are any hanges in employment due to the
reform. In addition, we examine entry into and exit out of the restaurant
industry.
Our unweighted average result shows that the VAT ut from 22% to
13% redued restaurant pries by 2.2% in Finland. Full pass-through to
onsumer pries would imply a 7.4% derease. Thus the result implies that
the atual prie redution was only a fourth of the full pass-through. The
onsumer-weighted prie response was somewhat larger, a 4% derease in
onsumer pries, or over half of the full pass-through. This implies that
larger restaurants redued their pries more than small restaurants. There is
a substantial heterogeneity in prie responses by restaurant type. However,
the estimation results suggest no inrease in demand for restaurant servies
or employment in the restaurant industry. Furthermore, we do not nd any
eets on entry into or exit out of the restaurant industry due to the reform.
2
Our results ontribute to a narrow literature estimating the eets of
onsumption taxes. Many studies in the previous literature onentrate on
industries with only few produers and industries where large ompanies
dominate the market. We onentrate instead on the restaurant industry,
whih ontains very heterogeneous rms and is a labor-intensive industry.
Also, the number of studies that have produed results on the quantity of
servies sold or wage sums is fairly limited. By linking our unique prie and
tax register data, we have an opportunity to estimate these margins as well,
and be more onlusive about the eetiveness of onsumption taxes.
Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) estimated the tax inidene on gasoline
pries in ertain states in the USA from a temporary repeal and reinstate-
ment of a gasoline onsumption tax. They found almost 100% pass-through
on pries. Marion and Muehlegger (2011) found similar estimates for fuel
pries. Carbonnier (2007) found lower pass-through for a ar retailer indus-
try than for a repair servie industry when he analyzed two separate VAT
rate redutions in Frane. He interpreted this to be a result of dierenes in
the degree of ompetition in these industries. Kosonen (2010) found that the
pass-through on pries was half of the full pass-through for the hairdressing
servie industry, after a VAT redution in Finland. Kosonen also studied
the demand for hairdressing servies and employment. He onluded that
the demand for these servies seems to be rather inelasti. Hairdressers and
restaurants resemble eah other sine both are labor-intensive servie setors.
Therefore it is not surprising that our results are very muh in line with that
study.
The paper proeeds as follows. Setion 2 presents the institutional bak-
ground and eonomi theory preditions as a result of the VAT redution.
Setion 3 presents the methods used in the study, setion 4 desribes the data
and setion 5 presents the results. Finally, setion 6 onludes the study.
2 Institutions and preditions
2.1 Value-added taxation in the EU
The European Union obligates all Member States to apply value-added tax-
ation as a onsumption tax system. Sine 1977 the EU has applied uniform
VAT overage under the Sixth VAT Diretive. The new VAT Diretive re-
plaed it in 2007 (CD 2006/112/EC). The Diretive states that Member
3
States an have one standard VAT rate between 15% and 25% and at most
two redued rates of at least 5%
2
. In Finland the standard VAT rate is
levied on most goods and is urrently 24%. There are two redued VAT
rates in Finland. The higher of these two, 14%, is levied on e.g. restaurant
meal sales. The lowest VAT rate, 10%, is levied on books, aommodation
servies, pharmaeutials et.
3
The Counil of the EU introdued the possibility of applying a redued
VAT rate on labor-intensive servies already in 1999 (CD 1999/85/EC). Al-
though redued VAT rates for ertain labor-intensive industries were possible
from 1999 onwards, suh rates were not available for restaurants until May
2009 (CD 2009/47/EC). Thus, prior to 2009, restaurant servies were subjet
to the standard VAT rate in all EU Member States. Frane was the rst to
apply a redued rate for restaurant servies. In July 2009, the VAT rate was
ut from 19.6% to 5.5% (OECD (2010)). Despite the substantial redution
in the VAT rate, pries only fell by 1.4% after the reform (MEIE (2010)).
This paper examines the eets of the reform whih took plae in Finland
at the beginning of July 2010 (HE 137/2009) when the VAT rate for restau-
rant servies was redued from 22% to 13%. At the same time the Finnish
government deided to inrease all VAT rates by 1 perentage point.
2.2 Tax shifting and optimal onsumption tax
Let us rst onsider the tax inidene of the VAT rate on onsumer pries.
A hange in the VAT rate an shift to onsumer pries by varying degrees.
Under perfet ompetition, the prie inidene depends on the elastiities of
demand and supply. For instane, if demand is fairly inelasti and supply
very elasti, there would be lose to full pass-through to onsumer pries.
In general, the pass-through to pries inreases with supply elastiity and
dereases with the demand elastiity.
When the number of rms is limited and/or there is strategi interation
between the rms (imperfet ompetition), onsumption taxes ould under-
or over-shift to onsumer pries. The elastiities of demand and supply also
2
There are some exeptions from the lowest tax rates, e.g. zero rates on books in the
United Kingdom. Some setors are also exempted from VAT, e.g. postal servies.
3
Reently there have been two inreases in VAT rates in Finland. Before July 2010 the
VAT rates were: 22%, 12% and 8%. After July 2010 all three VAT rates were inreased
by 1 perentage point. Again from the beginning of 2013 all VAT rates inreased by 1
perentage point. Thus the VAT rates are urrently: 24%, 14% and 10%.
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aet the pass-through in an imperfet ompetition model. Additionally, in
an imperfet ompetition model, the shape of the demand urve relative to
the perfet ompetition predition aets the pass-through. With a onave
demand urve, the tax under-shifts to pries but with a onvex demand urve
over- shifts to pries (Myles (1989), Weyl and Fabinger (2013)).
We study the prie inidene with a redution in the VAT rate for restau-
rant servies from 22% to 13%. The data inlude pries for the same meal
oered in the same restaurants before and after the reform. Thus, as we an-
alyze the prie eets, we an identify the proportional hange in onsumer
pries for eah meal in the following way:
∆ =
pa − pb
pb
∗ 100 = x% (2.1)
φ ∗ 1.22 = pb ◮ φ ∗ 1.13 = pa
where pa is the onsumer prie after the reform and pb is the onsumer
prie before the reform. The onsumer prie is the produer prie φ plus the
VAT. When there is 100% pass-through, the produer prie does not hange.
Thus the full pass-through is:
φ(1.13− 1.22)
φ1.22
∗ 100 = −7.38%
A ouple of remarks should be made. First, the quality of the meals ould
hange due to the reform. The quality of meals ould perhaps inrease as
the osts of produing them derease, if there are no hanges in pries. But
if the quality of meals inreases due to the reform, the restaurants are likely
also rename the meals as well, and this would not be problem for us. On
the other hand, the quality of meals ould derease in those restaurants that
lower their pries. Even where the prie dereases and the quality of the
produt dereases, prie hanges when applying the above equation would
give us an upper bound for the pass-through. However, it is important to note
that the prie data we have, onerns meals oered by restaurants exatly
with the same name before and after the reform. Thus, we assume that the
quality does not hange if the name of the meal does not hange.
Seond, we are not able to observe ross-prie eets on other goods or
servies. A restaurant meal an be a substitute or a omplement for other
goods or servies aeting the amount of onsumption or pries of these
5
other goods due to the reform for meals. For example, lunh meals during
the working day an be a substitute for lunh boxes or take-away meals from
a restaurant. On the other hand, a restaurant meal an be omplementary
to hotel servies, espeially during holiday seasons. Despite these problems,
restaurant meals represent only a small proportion of the whole onsump-
tion budget (3.6% in 2006) and thus the eets due to substitutability or
omplementarity should be small.
In order to design an optimal onsumption tax system, a perfetly om-
petitive model result implies that the onsumption tax rates of a good or a
servie should vary aording to the elastiity of its own demand, the elas-
tiity of supply and the ross-prie eets on other goods. In the ase of
fairly inelasti demand, a good should fae a higher tax rate than a good
with elasti demand, if ross-prie eets between taxed goods are zero. The
reason is that an inrease in the tax rate of an inelasti good would have only
little eet on demand for the good and thus lead to only small distortions in
the demand for that good (Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)).
However, ross-prie eets ould be high if there are lose omplements or
substitutes for a taxed good.
The literature presents another argument for eient onsumption taxa-
tion. This onerns the distortions reated by labor taxation on labor supply
(Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)). These distortions ould be diminished by
using onsumption taxation. The result is that these distortions diminish if
the onsumption of goods or servies highly omplementary with work are
taxed less, and vie versa. Clearly this suggests setting lower tax rates for
goods and servies that are losely related to work and labor, and tax more
the onsumption of goods that are related to leisure. We do not analyse this
argument in this paper. This is beause the omplementarity of a restaurant
meal with labor supply is not lear. It is omplementary with work if we
onsider lunhes during the working day. On the other hand, a restaurant
meal is omplementary with leisure in terms of enjoying meals one's spare
time, e.g. ne dining. Moreover, restaurant servies represent only a small
fration of the total onsumption basket of an average individual (3.6% in
2006 in Finland
4
). Thus hanges in taxation for this small share of one's
onsumption are not likely to greatly aet the substitutability of labor.
We assess the eieny of the onsumption tax system for restaurant
servies by examining the eet of the VAT ut on the quantity of restaurant
4
Statistis Finland: Household Budget Survey (2009).
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meals sold and wage sums paid to employees. The best ase senario to
evaluate the demand for a good would be to be able to observe the prie of
a good and the amount of the good sold by the rm. The seond best ase
is to observe pries and the total sales of the rm. This is what we have in
our data set, inluding pries and the reported value of turnover in onsumer
pries.
Assume for now that the whole turnover onsists of sold restaurant meals.
Then turnover is simply the quantity of restaurant meals sold times the on-
sumer prie. With this variable we estimate the hanges in demand (quan-
tity) due to the VAT reform. If there are no hanges in onsumer prie and
quantity, turnover would remain the same over time, before and after the
reform. However, if the onsumer prie dereases due to the VAT rate re-
dution and quantity remains the same, turnover dereases by the amount
of the prie derease. If the onsumer prie dereases and the quantity sold
inreases relatively more than the prie dereases, turnover would inrease.
We observe the onsumer pries for restaurant meals and the monthly level
onsumer prie value of total sales in the data before and after the VAT
redution. Thus we have an opportunity to investigate the hanges in the
quantity of meals sold for eah restaurant and interpret how demand hanged
due to the reform.
We also estimate the eets of the VAT redution on wage sums. The
osts of produing restaurant meals dereased due to the VAT redution.
This ould inrease the wage payments of a restaurant to its employees and/or
inrease the number of employees working in a restaurant. The wage sums
of restaurants would then inrease due to the reform if restaurants hire more
workfore and/or pay more wages to their urrent workers after the reform.
3 Methods
This setion desribes the methods. Beause of the exeptional data sets, we
make extensive use of graphial analysis to examine the eets of the reform
in this paper. We also use a natural experimental method to investigate
the average eet of the reform on pries, turnover and wage sums. We ap-
ply a dierene-in-dierene (DD) approah and thus ompare the outomes
between the treatment and ontrol groups over time.
We have a unique possibility to perform graphial analysis with our prie
data. We show the whole distribution of relative prie hanges, applying
7
the equation (2.1), as we follow the pries of the same produt or servie
before and after the reform. Graphial evidene shows expliitly the whole
range of prie hanges and thus is more informative than, for example, a
standard mean regression of the hange in pries. In our graphial analysis
the proportional prie hanges in Finnish restaurants are ompared to prie
hanges in Estonian restaurants and hotel room prie hanges in Finland.
We also perform omparisons within the restaurant industry using dierent
ategorial variables.
We also use a standard DD method with meal xed-eets to estimate
the average eet of the reform on meal pries. The simplest set-up of the
DD method is when outomes are observed for two separate groups for two
dierent time periods. The standard way to desribe the DD method is to
present the following equation:
Pit = ηi + β11(Treat)i + β21(After)t + β31(Treati ∗ Aftert) + β4(Xit) + εit
(3.1)
where the dependent variable P represents the logarithmi meal prie of rm i
at time t, the onstant ηi is the estimated xed eet for every meal, 1(Treat)
is an indiator variable with the value one for treated and zero otherwise,
1(After) is also an indiator variable with the value one after the reform and
zero otherwise, and 1(Treatment*After) represents the interation variable
of these two variables. The oeient of this interation term identies the
eet of the reform on outome P. X ontains a vetor of rm-level ontrol
variables and ε is the i.i.d. error term.
As a result of the xed-eets estimation, β3 represents the average pro-
portional hange in meal pries as a result of the reform. We are able to
perform a meal-level xed-eets estimate beause we followed the pries
of the same meals in the same restaurants over time, before and after the
reform. This gives us a very preise prie estimate.
The main identifying assumption in the DD approah is the parallel time
trends. Thus the time eets should behave similarly in both groups before
the reform. The dierene between the groups is that one of the groups
is exposed to a treatment and the other is not. The treatment group on-
sists of Finnish restaurants whih experiened the VAT redution. We use
many separate ontrol groups to show the robustness of the results. In our
main prie analysis we use restaurant meal pries in Estonia to formulate the
ontrol group. We also use Swedish and Norwegian Consumer Prie Index
8
(CPI) data for restaurants and Finnish hotel room pries to represent ontrol
groups.
One onern might be that restaurants in these ountries are not suitable
omparison groups for restaurants in Finland. However, there are a number
of reasons to believe that the assumption holds in this ase. All the ountries
are neighboring ountries to Finland and, for example, fae similar weather
onditions, vaation periods, global food pries, business yles, ulture et.
We have no reason to believe that e.g. Finnish and Estonian restaurants
would behave dierently from eah other during our short examination pe-
riod without an exogenous shok in Finland. Restaurants in Estonia ould
experiene dierent onditions in the long run, e.g. in the ompetitive envi-
ronment, but we do not onsider this to be a problem over our relatively short
examination period (3 months). In addition, we an test the robustness of
the results by omparing the pries of Finnish restaurants to restaurant meal
pries from the statistis oes in Norway and Sweden, whih are olleted
for CPI purposes. We believe that all these ontrol groups onstitute good
ounterfatuals for the treatment group.
In order to give further redibility to our approah, we use another ontrol
group from Finland, namely hotels, whih operate in an industry similar to
restaurants, but whih did not experiene the VAT ut. The VAT applied to
hotel servies was already at the lowest redued rate of 9% before the reform
in Finland. Hotels are used as a omparison group when we study prie
eets, but more importantly, we apply hotels as a ontrol group when we
are interested in the eets on quantity of meals sold and wage sums. We are
fored to do this beause of the lak of tax register data from the restaurants
in neighboring ountries. There might be problems in the analysis when
omparing restaurants to hotels. Hotels an, for example, have more exible
or organized priing strategies and fae more onentrated demand for their
servies within the alendar year than restaurants. More importantly, hotels
might have been aeted by the reform as many hotels also oer restaurant
servies. Also, there might be ross-prie eets between meals and hotel
room pries. However, despite of all these problems and the lak of any
other relevant ontrol group, we ompare these industries and try to onvine
that the omparison is plausible. To oer evidene favoring the omparison,
we nd a similar trend in turnover and wage sums over time for hotels and
restaurants (see Figure 9). Thus hotels seem to omprise a relatively good
ontrol group for restaurants. However, the monthly variation in demand for
hotel servies is more pronouned during summer period than for restaurant
9
servies and this ould still ause hallenges for our analysis.
We apply the same DD method, desribed in equation 3.1, when we
examine the demand and employment eets of the reform. The measure
applied for demand is the monthly turnover of the rms valued at onsumer
pries and for employment the measure is the monthly wage sums paid to
employees. In these estimations we use Finnish restaurants in the treatment
group and Finnish hotels in the ontrol groups beause we lak tax register
data from neighboring ountries.
One possible problem in using DD method ould be that the poliy hange
is not exogenous or the rms in the treatment group antiipated the reform
by hanging their behavior before the atual poliy hange. The Finnish
government allowed the restaurant industry, and not other industries, to
apply a redued VAT rate sine the EU Diretive permitted them to do so.
Thus, the reform was not solely dependent on the eonomi onditions in the
restaurant industry, rather it was an attempt to revive the eonomy overall.
Also, in gure 1 we show that we do not nd any empirial evidene to
support antiipation behavior among restaurants. Therefore, we believe that
it is possible to use the standard DD method to examine the ausal eets
of the reform on restaurant meal pries, demand for restaurant servies and
wage sums paid to employees. However, beause of the short examination
period available we onentrate only on the short-run hanges.
One hallenge in our empirial set-up is to present appropriate standard
errors for the estimates. Two previous papers by Bertrand et al. (2004) and
Cameron et al. (2008) emphasise this problem. The problem arises when the
number of groups used in the estimations is small. It ould be, for example,
that there is an unobserved shok aeting the groups' behavior dierently
and thus biasing the standard errors. Fortunately, the two papers mentioned
above oer us tools to overome this problem. Following the guidelines of
these papers, we apply a blok bootstrap strategy to alulate the standard
errors. We use two sets of lusters. First, we apply ountry-level lusters
in the prie estimations. Seond, when we ompare Finnish restaurants to
Finnish hotels we use industry-level lusters in the prie, quantity and em-
ployment estimations. The strategy of alulating standard errors does not
aet the signiane of results too muh as, at most, it doubles the stan-
dard errors of the main prie estimates with no lustering. However, for the
weighted prie results blok bootstrapping is not possible. Then we only ap-
ply heterosedastiity-onsistent standard errors and the signiane of these
results should be interpreted with aution.
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Figure 1: Longer-term development of restaurant pries in Finland, Sweden
and Norway
4 Data
We have prie data from a prie olletion survey whih was onduted on
the basis of a random sample of restaurants and hotels from the Tax Ad-
ministration data inluding all rms liable for VAT in Finland. We designed
our own survey method to ollet pries. We were able to ollet pries from
approximately 750 restaurants in Finland before and after the reform. The
data inlude many ategorial variables whih we an use to divide pries,
e.g. belonging to a hain, restaurant type, et.
We took a random sample just before the reform in Marh 2010 from
both the restaurant and hotel industries. The sample is representative of all
restaurants and hotels in Finland. The prie olletion was made before and
after the reform, i.e. in May/June 2010 and July/August 2010. The survey
was also onduted in Estonia, where the VAT rate on restaurant meals did
not hange during the olletion period. The sample of Estonian restaurants
11
was also a random sample from the Estonian tax register data.
5
In the olletion method, we mainly olleted pries from the internet. If
this was not possible via the internet we olleted the pries by phone. The
olletion followed a questionnaire where the restaurants were divided into
four ategories by restaurant type.
6
Eah ategory had its own questionnaire
with a minimum of 7 pries and a maximum of 11 pries. In eah round
of surveys (before and after) we reorded the prie of the same produt
from eah rm. Also, the prie olletors used exatly the same olletion
questionnaires and methods in both ountries, whih is very important for
our analysis. In addition, the prie olletion for hotels followed the same
priniples than the survey for restaurants. Hotel pries refer to hotel room
pries. Table 1 presents desriptive statistis of the prie data in euros. On
average, meal pries seem to be lower in Estonia than in Finland but this is
not a substantial problem as we are interested in the prie hanges over a
short period of time.
7
Finland Estonia
Variable Mean SD N Mean SD N
Main Meal 10.68 7.10 1452 6.51 3.97 746
Other Meal 9.97 5.89 1146 6.35 3.67 748
Vege Meal 8.94 4.64 900 3.72 2.02 674
Pizza 7.71 2.27 704 2.97 1.60 226
Appetizer 4.81 2.90 678 3.34 2.50 542
Lunh 8.30 2.69 464 3.12 1.85 266
Wine 8.70 11.44 204 3.98 6.64 220
Beer 4.44 .97 194 2.36 .71 320
Hotel prie 156.38 246.67 518
Table 1: Prie data: Continuous variables
We also olleted various rm-level ategorial variables. The loation of
the rm (Finland/Estonia), the method of olletion (phone/internet), be-
longing to a hain and belonging to a lobbying union representing restaurants
5
We also use CPI data sets for restaurant meal pries in Sweden and Norway as om-
parison groups in our prie-response analysis.
6
The restaurant types are a la arte, fast food, afeteria and lunh restaurants.
7
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the desriptive statistis for CPI data from the
statistis oes in Sweden and Norway.
12
and hotels in Finland (MaRa)
8
are the most important ategorial variables
in the analysis. In our study, a rm is onsidered to being a hain if there
is more than one restaurant with same name or rm identier. We also at-
egorize franhising rms as hains. MaRa, instead, represents the leading
national trade and labor market assoiation in the hospitality industry in
Finland, inluding e.g. both restaurants and hotels. MaRa members pro-
due over 80% of all turnover in the setor. Table 2 desribes the statistis
of these variables (in euros). Most of the pries are from the internet, almost
nine out of ten pries in Estonia were olleted from the web, whereas in
Finland a quarter of the pries were olleted by phone. It also seems that
there are more restaurants belonging to a hain Finland than in Estonia.
Finland Estonia
Variable Share SD N of rms Share SD N of rms
Internet .72 .45 1345 .89 .32 712
Phone .28 .45 523 .11 .32 88
Chain .32 .47 598 .15 .36 120
MaRa .31 .46 572
Table 2: Prie data: Categorial variables
The histogram in Figure 2 ompares the mean of three meal pries be-
tween Finnish and Estonian restaurants. It seems that the distribution of
restaurant meal pries is relatively similar in Finland and in Estonia. How-
ever, the variation in pries seems to be larger in Finland and there is more
weight on the right-hand side of the distribution in Finland than in Estonia.
Nevertheless, the shapes of the distributions are similar, and thus we are able
to ompare Finnish pries with Estonian pries.
The seond data set is from the Finnish Tax Administration and inlude
all rms liable for VAT in Finland. A rm is liable with register to the
tax authority if its turnover for the aounting period (12 months) is over
8,500 euros. The data ontain important monthly-level information about
the rms' ativities inluding turnover and the wage sums paid by the rms.
Table 3 shows the pre-reform desriptive statistis of turnover and wage
sums per month for Finnish restaurants and hotels. It seems obvious that
8
Oially, the name of the assoiation is the Finnish Hospitality Assoiation (in
Finnish, Matkailu- ja Ravintolapalvelut MaRa).
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Figure 2: Histogram of the mean of three meal pries in Estonia and Finland
hotels are larger than restaurants, on average. We also have an extensive
set of yearly-level tax reord data whih we an employ as ontrols in our
estimations.
Restaurants Hotels
Turnover Wage sum Turnover Wage sum
Mean 38,166 12,430 82,090 33,804
Median 14,861 4,876 8,048 11,108
SD 373,656 57,116 360,798 90,372
N 11,343 11,343 1,245 1,245
Table 3: Desriptive statistis for monthly pre-reform turnover and wage
sums of Finnish restaurants and hotels
Figure 3 shows the average monthly turnover of restaurants taxed at dif-
ferent VAT rates over time from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2011.
The standard VAT rate, 23% after July 2010, and two redued VAT rates,
14
13% and 9% after July 2010, are levied on dierent goods
9
. The Figure
learly shows the VAT reform for restaurants in July 2010, marked with a
solid vertial line, as the turnover reported in the seond lowest VAT rate
inreases onsiderably and at the same time turnover in the standard VAT
rate dereases. The reported turnover dereases by approximately 15,000
euros at the standard VAT rate and inreases by a similar amount at the
redued rate. We onsider this to represent the share of turnover in restau-
rants from meal sales, on average. Thus less than half of the turnover of
restaurants omes from sales of meals (inluding non-aloholi beverages)
10
,
the remainder oming from selling alohol, drinks, et. whih are not taxed
at the redued VAT rate. Sales at the lowest VAT rate seem to be irrelevant
for restaurants over time.
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Figure 3: Average turnover of restaurants taxed at dierent VAT rates over
time
9
Before July 2010 all three VAT rates were 1 perentage point lower. From the begin-
ning of 2013 the VAT rates have been 24%, 14% and 10%.
10
Take-away meals were already at the lower VAT rate of 12% before the reform of July
2010.
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5 Results
5.1 Prie Eets
In our main prie analysis we formulate a omposite of the average of three
main meal pries for eah restaurant before and after the reform.
11
Therefore,
the following graphial analysis of relative hanges in onsumer pries shows
the hanges in this variable. We onstrut this omposite meal in order
to avoid being overly dependent on the hanges in individual meal prie.
By onstruting a omposite meal we an examine the entire hange in a
restaurant menu more preisely. However, we also oer the average prie
hange results for eah individual prie.
We use equation (2.1) to alulate the relative prie hange for eah rm.
The relative prie hange denotes the perentage hange in the prie after
the reform ompared to the prie level before the reform. Thus we an show
the whole distribution of prie hanges, whih gives very expliit evidene of
how pries have hanged.
Figure 4 presents the relative prie hanges as a omposite in Finland
and Estonia. Similarly, Figure 5 shows the distribution of relative prie
hanges in omposite pries of restaurant meals and hotel rooms in Finland.
The vertial line represents the loation of full pass-through in both graphs,
whih is -7.4%. A substantial proportion of restaurants did not hange their
pries at all in Finland, the zero relative hange in the Figure. This indiates
that over half of the whole sample of restaurants did not hange their pries
as a result of the VAT ut. However, there is a distintive peak at the
level of full pass-through. These restaurants shifted the entire tax hange to
their pries. We do not observe muh hange in hotel pries in Finland or
restaurant pries in Estonia.
Next we divide the relative prie hange gures for restaurants by rm-
level harateristis. These divisions desribe the relative prie hanges
among Finnish restaurants very preisely. In Figure 6 we divide the data
by whether or not a restaurant belongs to a hain. The Figure shows that
restaurants belonging to a hain hanged their pries more often after the
VAT ut than those not belonging to a hain. Notie also that hain sta-
tus divides the sample very learly into those that hanged their pries and
those that did not. Only 25% of all hain restaurants did not hange their
11
If we have less than three meal pries for an individual restaurant, we use only one or
two pries as a omposite meal.
16
0
50
10
0
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
Estonia Finland
Pe
rc
e
n
t
Relative change in composite (3) prices
Random collection: Finland vs Estonia
Figure 4: Distribution of relative prie hanges in Finnish and Estonian
restaurants
pries and 40% responded with full pass-through. Almost all of the rest
also dereased their pries and we observe only few prie inreases among
hains. This suggests that the more organized restaurants hanged their
prie more. They may operate in a more ompetitive environment, whih
may have fored them to redue their pries more due to the VAT reform.
Also, they might have more entralised prie setting strategies than inde-
pendent restaurants that are not part of a hain. It is also remarkable that
restaurants not belonging to a hain have almost an equal amount of both
prie dereases and inreases. Also, for them, there is no lear peak at the
level of full pass-through.
In Figure 7, we divide the data into those restaurants that belong to
MaRa and to those that do not. The gure evidently shows that these
lobbying union members redued their pries more often than others. Figures
6 and 7 are very similar beause many of the hains also belong to MaRa.
However, Figure 7 also shows a small peak at the level of full pass-through
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e hanges in Finnish restaurants and
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for restaurants not belonging to MaRa. Furthermore, this suggests a similar
interpretation as we found for hain restaurants: more organized restaurants
had larger prie responses to the reform than independent restaurants.
We employ a natural experimental method to estimate the average prie
eets of the VAT reform. The dependent variable is the log of omposite
prie, inluding 3 pries from the same restaurant before and after the reform.
All estimates are dierenes-in-dierenes (DD) results omparing Finnish
restaurant pries in the treatment group with several ontrol groups over
time.
Table 4 presents the average estimates of the eet of the VAT reform on
pries. The table shows omparisons of Finnish restaurant pries with Es-
tonian restaurant pries in olumns (1) to (3), Finnish hotel room pries in
olumn (4), Swedish restaurant pries in olumn (5) and Norwegian restau-
rant pries in olumn (6). Column (1) presents the DD results ontrolling
for ovariates and olumns from (2) to (6) present the xed-eets results.
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Our main result in olumn (2) indiates that unweighted meal pries in
Finnish restaurants fell by 2.2% as a result of the VAT redution when we
ompare them to Estonian meal pries. The response in olumn (3) is a
bit larger, a 2.8% derease in lunh pries. This suggests that lunh pries
are a bit more responsive to the tax redution. However, the response is
not statistially dierent from the main estimate. When omparing with
hotel pries, in olumn (4), meal pries seem to deline even more: 4.4%.
This results is somewhat dependent on few prie observations and overall
the variation in hotel room pries is muh larger than in meal pries. A
omparison with Swedish meal pries from the CPI data shows that the
average response is only a 1.2% derease in onsumer pries. However, the
CPI data from Sweden inludes only a very small number of observations for
restaurant meals, see Table A1 in the Appendix. The prie derease is a bit
larger than our main estimate as we use Norwegian restaurant meal pries
as a omparison group, in olumn (6).
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ording to whether restau-
rants belong to MaRa or not
We present the weighted xed eet results in Table 5. The weighted
results aim at measuring the prie hange for a representative onsumer.
With this weighting we also take into aount the heterogeneity in restaurant
sizes. We use turnover statistis for 2010 to onstrut the weights. In pratie
we onstrut a ategorial variable of 10 size groups to weight the results.
We do this beause the CPI data for Swedish and Norwegian restaurants
ontain only this kind of ategorial variable without information about the
exat numerial value of yearly turnover.
The dependent variable is again the log of omposite prie. Column (1)
in Table 5 shows again the main unweighted result, olumn (2) presents
the main weighted estimate, olumn (3) shows estimates omparing Finnish
restaurants with hotels. Columns (4) and (5) ompare Finnish restaurant
meal pries with Swedish and Norwegian meal pries. The tax inidene on
pries beause of the VAT redution varies from a 2.4% to 5.9% derease in
pries, depending on the omparison group.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Composite Composite Lunh Composite Composite Composite
Control Est Est Est Hotels Swe Nor
DD -0.022** -0.022** -0.028** -0.044** -0.012 -0.031**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.009) (0.016)
Speiation OLS FE FE FE FE FE
N 2250 2250 1162 2020 1270 2155
R2 0.200 0.153 0.128 0.081 0.163 0.088
N of rms 1125 581 1010 764 1106
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Main estimation results. Dierenes-in-dierenes estimates of
pries.
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the omposite prie variable. Column (1)
presents the DD results ontrolled for restaurant ategory, olletion method and restau-
rant type, olumns (2) to (4) present the DD results from the xed-eets regression.
Columns (1) to (3) ompare Finnish and Estonian restaurant pries and olumn (4) om-
pares hanges in Finnish restaurant pries with hotel pries. Columns (5) and (6) ompare
Finnish omposite restaurant meal pries with Swedish and Norwegian meal pries. The
standard errors are alulated by using ountry or industry lusters with a blok boot-
strapping method.
The overall result is that weighting by restaurant size ategories leads
to larger prie hange estimates than without weights. This observation
suggests that relatively larger restaurants redued their pries more than
smaller ones. The weighting inreases all point estimates ompared to the
unweighted main result but they are still smaller than full pass-through (-
7.4%). On average, the results suggest that the representative meal prie
dereased by slightly more than half of the full pass-though.
There are number of aveats with these weights, however. The turnover
statistis also inlude other sales than restaurant meals as long as these sales
are made within the same rm. In some ases there are really large or-
porations that have a range of ativities from supermarket ativities to gas
station operations, as well as restaurant operations. We takled this problem
by reduing the weights espeially for rms that were not lassied as primar-
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VARS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Norm weight weight weight weight
Hotel Swe Nor
DD -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.059*** -0.024*** -0.042***
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
N 2250 2250 2020 1270 3182
R2 0.153 0.350 0.131 0.380 0.320
N of rms 1125 1144 1010 764 1663
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Estimation results weighted by turnover
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of omposite prie
variable. Column (1) presents the main result, olumns (2) to (5) present the weighted
estimation results, where the weights are rm turnover in 2010. Columns (1) and (2)
ompare hanges in Finnish and Estonian restaurant pries, whereas olumn (3) ompares
hanges in Finnish restaurant and hotel pries. Columns (5) and (6) ompare Finnish
omposite restaurant meal pries with Swedish and Norwegian pries from CPI data. The
heterosedastiity-onsistent standard errors are in parenthesis.
ily belonging to the restaurant setor. Still, the whole weighting proess is
somewhat ad ho in nature, but nevertheless the best available. The weighted
results should be regarded as indiative rather than preise estimates. We
expet that these weighted results oer an upper bound for the atual prie
hanges as the weighting ould still be too high for large restaurants even after
the orretions we make. We also have to be areful when interpreting the
signiane of the results as we present naive heterosedastiity-onsistent
standard errors.
To shed more light on what drives the heterogeneity of the results, Tables
6 and 7 show the results where the eet of the reform, represented by the
DD-variable, is interated with the main ategorial variables we olleted
in the prie survey proess. Column (1) in Table 6 presents the result where
the DD variable is interated by the type of restaurant. The omitted type
is fast-food restaurants. The results indiate that there are no dierenes
in pass-through whether the restaurant is fast-food, afeteria or a la arte.
But the results suggest that espeially restaurants serving mostly lunhes
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redued their pries the most. In olumn (2) the DD variable is interated
by whether the pries where olleted from the internet or by phone. The
prie redution is larger among restaurants for whih we were able to nd a
website listing the pries.
VARS (1) (2)
Classiation Collet rule
DD -0.014* -0.025**
(0.008) (0.012)
A la arte -0.007
*DD (0.005)
Cafe -0.007
*DD (0.009)
Lunh -0.020**
*DD (0.009)
Phone 0.015**
*DD (0.008)
N 2250 2250
R
2
0.171 0.163
N of rms 1125 1125
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Estimation results divided by restaurant type and olletion method
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of the omposite
prie variable. Column (1) presents the results where the DD variable is interated with
the 4-step restaurant lassiation and olumn (2) interated with the prie olletion
method (internet or phone). The standard errors are alulated by using ountry lusters
with a blok bootstrapping method.
Table 7 presents further divisions of the results. These are the same divi-
sions we presented in Figures 6 and 7. It ertainly holds here that if a restau-
rant belongs to hain or union, pries are ut more than in the rest of the
sample. The results even suggest that most of the prie responses ome from
these more 'organized' or 'unionized' restaurants, and among restaurants not
belonging to these groups, the prie response was very small if signiantly
dierent from zero at all, on average. This is the same onlusion we already
23
reahed based on the graphial analysis.
VARS Chain MaRa
DD -0.006 -0.012*
(0.005) (0.007)
Chain -0.040**
*dd (0.017)
MaRa -0.029***
*dd (0.012)
S-Group
*dd
N 2250 2250
R
2
0.279 0.215
N of rms 1125 1125
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Estimation results divided by whether an establishment belongs to
a hain or to MaRa
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of omposite
prie variable. Column (1) presents results where DD variable is interated with whether
restaurant belongs to a hain or not and olumn (2) whether restaurant belongs to MaRa or
not. The standard errors are alulated by using ountry lusters with blok bootstrapping
method.
The results, thus far, show the responses on the log omposite of three
pries. However, this perhaps begs the question as to how dependent the
results are on this ategorization or how heterogeneous the prie responses
are aross meal types. Figure 8 shows the average relative redution in pries
aross the prie ategories in our prie data. Pries fell by a similar amount
in most prie ategories. The largest point estimate of prie hanges is for
desserts. However, this is still not statistially dierent from any other meal
pries aeted by the VAT redution. Wine and beer are in the ontrol group,
sine their VAT remained at the standard rate. We also observe zero prie
eets for them. This is also a robustness hek for our method.
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h
prie ategory and 95% ondene intervals
5.2 Demand eets
We start the analysis of demand eets by showing graphial evidene. Fig-
ure 9 desribes the development of average monthly turnover in thousands
of euros for the restaurant and hotel industries over time from January 2008
to Deember 2011. The solid line on the horizontal axis is the time of the
VAT reform, July 2010, and the dashed lines are for every July in the fol-
lowing years. The gure shows that the overall trend over time is similar for
these two industries, although on average it seems to be more pronouned
for hotels. There seems to be a lot of variation in turnover during the al-
endar year. Consistently, July in eah year has the highest turnover in both
industries. However, the variation reates hallenges for statistial analysis.
To redue the variation and to identify the hanges in turnover learly,
we ompute a perentage hange variable for eah rm. It ompares the
monthly turnover with the turnover in the same rm 12 months previously.
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Figure 9: Average turnover over time for restaurants and hotels
As a formula the variable is:
SR,m =
1
nR
∑
iǫR
sm,i − sm−12,i
s¯y−1,i
(5.1)
△Sm = SR,m − SH,m
where i denotes the rm, R denotes the restaurant industry,H denotes hotels,
m is the month, y is the year, n is the number of rms, s¯y−1,i denotes the
average monthly turnover of rm i in the previous year and sm−12,i refers to
the turnover of rm i 12 months previously. We also ompare the perentage
hanges in turnover between groups by taking the dierenes of the means
of the groups, e.g. between restaurants and hotels, desribed by △Sm. In
addition, we apply this method to investigate the hanges in wage sums as
well in setion 5.3.
We apply some neessary data restritions. We examine only those restau-
rants where over half of the turnover omes from restaurant meals and those
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hotels where at least a third of the turnover omes from hotel room sales.
This is neessary as the industry lassiation is not exat enough to separate
rms by the prinipal sales of the rms. First, the problem is that there are
many restaurants and hotels with oasional operations only. The restaurant
industry inludes rms oering oasional atering servies, bars and kiosks
et. Similarly, the hotel industry inludes many motels whih operate during
the summer only and rms renting ottages oasionally. Seond, there are
some large rms with a restaurant or hotel industry lassiation but the
turnover of these rms omes from operations other than selling meals or of-
fering hotel servies. Third, there are also rms oded in dierent industries
than restaurants or hotels but where a large share of their turnover omes
from sales of restaurant meals or hotel servies. The method of examining
hanges in onsumer pries presented in equation (5.1) also requires rms
to have positive turnover over time. Thus we use this method to examine
the intensive margin responses. The relevant data set used in the analysis is
approximately half of the total number of the rms desribed in table 3. This
data restrition is valid until setion 5.4, where we investigate the extensive
margin responses.
Figure 10 desribes the weighted estimates
12
for SR,m and SH,m in the
upper panel and the mean dierene of these two △Sm in the lower panel
over time. The interpretation of gure 10 is as follows: if the onsumer
pries and quantities sold hange immediately after the reform and remain
unhanged in the long run, the turnover hanges would emerge in the rst 12
months after the reform and there would be no hanges after 12 months. This
is beause we ompare monthly turnover with turnover 12 months previously
for eah rm. The horizontal axis is in months from the reform, and thus zero
refers to July 2010, -12 is July 2009 and so on. The overall trends seem to
be relatively similar between the groups before the reform although there are
small dierenes just before the reform. Nevertheless, the gure shows that
there is a derease in the hange in turnover right after the reform among
restaurants relative to hotels.
We estimated 2% unweighted and 4% weighted pass-through to onsumer
pries. With no hanges in the quantity of servies sold, we should see a 2-4%
drop in turnover for restaurants. If the quantities sold inrease due to the
reform, the hange in turnover would be positive or at least loser to zero
than the observed pass-through to pries. Figure 10 shows that turnover
12
We use average turnover in 2009 for eah rm to weight the estimates.
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dereases after the reform among restaurants. This gives us initial evidene
suggesting no inrease in demand for restaurant meals due to the reform.
In addition, Figure 1 suggests that onsumer pries in the Finnish restau-
rant industry ath up with pries in restaurants in neighboring ountries
soon after the reform. Figure 10 indiates a similar development in turnover.
After the reform the hange in turnover gradually inreases and six months
after the reform there is no dierene in the hanges in turnover between
restaurants and hotels. This suggests that the inreases in onsumer pries
aet strongly the turnover valued at onsumer pries, whih further implies
that demand for restaurant meals is inelasti in respet of pries in the short
run. However, the quantities of restaurant meals sold ould also inrease
gradually over longer period of time, whih then would inrease turnover.
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Figure 10: Changes in monthly turnover of restaurants and hotels over time
Nevertheless, there is a reason whih ould dampen the size of the eet.
Turnover inludes sales of produts and servies other than restaurant meals,
as gure 3 previously desribed. For example, the VAT rate for alohol and
drinks sold in restaurants is dierent than that for meals, but these goods
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are inluded in the total turnover. However, the data restritions mentioned
above diminish this problem. The hanges in turnover should, however, be
orret if the share of turnover oming from the other VAT bases is unhanged
due to the reform.
An additional margin of response ould be a hange in tax evasion in the
industry due to the reform. This is not diretly observable in the data and we
annot investigate this hannel of response preisely. However, we an disuss
the possible eets of tax evasion with respet to our results. The benets
from tax evasion deline after the reform, whih ould end up reduing tax
evasion. A redution in tax evasion would inrease reported turnover at
the lower VAT rate and turnover would also inrease in response.
13
This
eet would go in the same diretion as the demand response and vie versa.
Thus our estimate would be a lower bound for the real estimate of reported
turnover and quantity hanges.
Next we show the hange in turnover for rms in our prie sample. We
measure the hange in turnover per quarter to redue the seasonal varia-
tion in the data. Again we apply the method presented in equation (5.1).
Figure 11 illustrates the hange in turnover for restaurants by dividing the
data aording to their hain status. We split the data by hain status as
hain restaurants redued their pries more often than others (see Figure
6). Therefore, one would expet to observe growth in turnover espeially
for those restaurants if the quantities respond to prie hanges onsiderably.
The horizontal axis presents quarters from the reform and the solid vertial
line is for the time of the VAT ut. It seems that there is a downward sloping
hange in turnover right after the reform for hain restaurants. The hange
in turnover one quarter after the reform for hain restaurants seems also to
be similar in size than the prie pass-through was. This learly suggests that
the quantity of restaurant meals sold did not inrease in response to the re-
form. Furthermore, these observations together imply that the demand for
restaurant meals is rather inelasti.
In addition, we estimate the eet of the reform on turnover using a
13
There might be some manipulation in reported VAT by rms due to the reform.
Restaurants, for example, ould report part of their sales at redued VAT rate for whih
that rate is not appliable. We annot observe how orretly rms apply the reporting
rules in the data. However, this kind of report manipulation is illegal (tax evasion), and we
think it is not a great problem for the analysis. Yet the eets on total turnover (turnover
taxed at dierent VAT rates in total) that should provide a orret estimate if tax evasion
behavior is not aeted in total.
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Figure 11: Change in quarterly turnover of restaurants: Competitive and
not ompetitive
similar DD strategy as we did for pries. In these estimations we again
ollapse the data from months to quarters and use the data only one year
before and one year after the reform to diminish the variation in the data.
Thus these results an be interpreted as short-run eets on demand.
We ompare the log of turnover between restaurants and hotels before and
after the reform. The logarithmi outome produes proportional hanges
and the xed eet model ontrols for the history of eah rm in a similar
fashion as the graphial analysis presented above. The dierene between
the graphial analysis and the estimation strategy is that the omparison is
now made with the previous quarter of the year, not with the year before.
Table 8 shows the results. The rst part of Table 8, olumns (1) and
(2), is for all the restaurants and hotels in the data. Column (1) reports the
DD result and olumn (2) interats the DD variable with the MaRa dummy,
MaRa being the union representing the restaurant and hotel industries. The
seond part of the table, olumns (3) to (6), is only for rms for whih we
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have prie data. Otherwise, olumns (3) and (4) are onstruted as olumns
(1) to (2). Column (5) distinguishes the eet on hain restaurants from
other restaurants, olumn (6) separates the eet on restaurants that did
redue their pries by over 5% right after the reform from other restaurants.
Overall the results imply a derease in turnover for restaurants after the
reform. Column (1) shows that the turnover of restaurants dereased by
4.2% after the reform relative to hotels. In our prie analysis we found a
4.4% derease in onsumer pries for restaurants when we ompared them to
hotels (see Table 4 olumn (4)). Thus the hanges in turnover and onsumer
pries are very similar. This learly suggests no inrease in the quantity of
restaurant meals sold in the restaurant industry due to the reform. In olumn
(2) we interat the DD variable with a dummy of belonging to MaRa or not.
It seems that the turnover of MaRa restaurants dereases less due to the
reform than the average impat. However, the overall eet is still negative
also for MaRa restaurants.
We also estimate the eets of the reform for the data for whih we
have prie observations. Beause of the small sample and large variation in
turnover, we do not nd any statistially signiant results. Nevertheless the
point estimates are what we should expet based on the graphial analysis
above. They are mostly negative and in olumn (5), where we interat the
hain dummy with the DD variable, it shows that turnover dereased the
most among restaurants belonging to a hain. This is also true for those
restaurants that redued their onsumer pries most right after the reform,
in olumn (6). In general, it also seems that the estimates produed by
using the sample for whih we have pries (olumns 3 and 4) are a bit larger
than for the whole sample (olumns 1 and 2), however, the dierene is not
statistially signiant for any omparison.
14
14
The results survived a battery of robustness heks. For example, we performed
plaebo treatments a year before and a year after the atual reform and both of these
produed zero results. This also suggests that the main assumption of the DD method,
parallel time trends between groups, is satised. We also varied the time frame used from
the base ase of two years to one, three and four years. These hanges do not aet the
results for turnover muh. In addition, we added yearly level ontrol variables to the
speiations but these did not hange the results.
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5.3 Employment eets
We analyse the employment eets by examining the hanges in rms' monthly
wage sums paid to their employees. If there are hanges in the number of
employees or in the salaries of existing employees, we should observe it with
this variable. One of the EU's main reason for allowing redued VAT rates
for labor-intensive industries was to stimulate employment. Thus, from a
poliy point of view, it is highly relevant to study these eets.
We start again with graphial evidene. Figure 12 desribes the hanges
in monthly wage sums similarly as we desribed in gure 11 for turnover.
Therefore, the analysis is only on the intensive margin responses. The trends
in the hanges in these two gures are relatively similar before the reform.
However, there is no lear hange in restaurants' wage sums after the reform.
This also seems to hold if we ompare the hanges in restaurants' wage sums
to the orresponding trend in hotels' wage sums (lower panel of Figure 12).
It even seems that the average hange in wage sums for restaurants dereases
slightly right after the reform. Therefore, based on the graphial evidene,
we do not detet any lear hanges, on average, in restaurant wage sums due
to the reform.
We also estimate the eets of the reform on wage sums using the DD
approah. We aggregate the data into quarters and use the log of wage sums
as a dependent variable similarly as in the turnover estimations. Table 9
reports the results. The olumns are organized exatly as in Table 8. There
are no statistially signiant hanges in the wage sums of restaurants due to
the reform. All the DD estimates are negative, suggesting that some of the
restaurants even dereased their wage payments or the number of employees
after the reform. However, none of these estimates are statistially signi-
ant. The negative point estimates suggest that restaurants did not inrease
their wage sums due to the reform. We also interated the DD variable
with the same set of ategorial variables as for the turnover estimations.
Restaurants belonging to MaRa or a hain, or restaurants whih hanged
their prie most, all have positive interation oeients. However, again,
none are statistially signiant. The zero result for wage sums seems to be a
fair onlusion from these estimations. This gives more evidene supporting
the ineieny of VAT redutions for labor-intensive industries. This also
supports the view that VAT redutions are not an eient way to inrease
employment in the industry, whih was the objetive dened by the EU for
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Figure 12: Change in monthly wage sums of restaurants and hotels
VAT uts for labor-intensive industries.
15
5.4 Entry and exit
An additional hannel of response ould be in extensive margin. This would
be reeted in an inrease in the entry of new restaurants in the industry
and/or a derease in the number of exits. The osts of entering the market
dereased due to the reform, and this might have stimulated new businesses.
In addition, the reform, of ourse, also dereased the osts of operating rms
in the industry, and thus ould have revitalized those businesses struggling
in the restaurant setor, resulting in a derease in exits. Thus, to provide a
onlusive analysis, we study the number of new entries and exits by om-
paring hotels and restaurants over time. This is possible as we have the total
15
Again, we heked the robustness of the results similarly as desribed in footnote 14
for turnover. The results survived these examinations well.
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data for all restaurants and hotels in the industry whih are obliged to regis-
ter with the tax authority. In this setion, we only emphasise the graphial
evidene.
First, in Figure 13 we show how many entries and exits there are per
quarter. It would seem natural for the number of entries and exits to be muh
higher in the restaurant than the hotel industry. The gure indiates that
the number of entries roughly equals the number of exits in both industries,
leaving the total number of rms unhanged. Both the number of entries
and exits seems to be more pronouned in the rst quarter of the year.
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Figure 13: Number of entries and exits over time: Restaurants and hotels
To study the possible eets of the reform, we also plot the probabilities
of exit and entry in Figure 14. Both the exit and entry probabilities seem
to be relatively stable over time, although there are some exeptions from
the overall trend, e.g. the spike of exits in the rst quarter of 2011 among
hotels (quarter 2 in the gure). Thus, until now we may be fairly sure in
onluding that we do not observe any hange in exits or entries due to the
reform. However, we still estimate the DD model between restaurants and
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hotels, and present the estimates and 95% ondene intervals in Figure 15.
The estimation onrms our previous onlusion: we do not see any hange
in DD estimates, neither for entries nor exits after the reform. However, it is
still possible to see some hanges over a longer period of time, but, at least
after 1.5 years, no evidene of hange is observable.
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Figure 14: Exit and entry probabilities over time: hotels and restaurants
6 Conlusions
We examine the eets of a VAT ut on restaurant meal pries, demand and
wage sums paid to employees in Finland. The VAT rate was redued from
22% to 13% from the beginning of July 2010. The EU Member States were
allowed to apply redued VAT rates for restaurant servies just one year
before the Finnish reform (CD 2009/47/EC). Thus restaurants did not have
muh time to antiipate the hange. We also think that poliy endogeneity is
not a substantial problem, sine it was beause of the EC Diretive that the
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Figure 15: DD estimates for exit and entry over time: hotels vs. restaurants
Finnish government hose to apply redued VAT to the restaurant industry
rather than other similar industries. Therefore, we have an interesting op-
portunity to redibly estimate the eets of onsumption taxes on dierent
important margins of response.
We use an extensive amount of graphial evidene in the analysis. This is
possible beause we have unique rm-level prie data and tax reord data for
monthly turnover and wage sums. With our prie data, reated espeially for
this study, we are able to show the whole distribution of prie hanges due to
the reform. This is not ommon in the previous literature. In addition, we
have an opportunity to estimate rarely available margin of response in the
previous literature as we approximate the hanges in quantities of restaurant
meals sold after onsumption tax reform. Using these information together
we may draw a onlusion of the eetiveness of onsumption taxes on this
setor.
We make use of the standard dierene-in-dierene approah with xed
eets to estimate the average eet of the reform on onsumer pries, de-
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mand for restaurant meals and wage sums. Our main estimate implies that
the VAT ut redued restaurant meal pries on average by 2.2%. A full
pass-through would have implied a 7.4% onsumer prie redution. Thus,
the prie redution is approximately a quarter of full pass-through to pries.
The weighted hange in pries was higher, 4%, over half of the full pass-
through. The interpretation of the dierene between the estimates is that,
on average, larger rms redued pries more than smaller rms. Also, there
seem to be large dierenes in the prie estimates, espeially depending on
whether or not the restaurant belongs to a hain or MaRa (the union rep-
resenting restaurants and hotels). If a restaurant belongs to one (or both)
of these ategories, the prie hange was muh larger than in our base-line
estimates. Independent rms, not belonging to any union or hain, seem to
have mostly ignored the reform as they did not hange their pries at all in
a result of the reform. We also found that lunh restaurants redued their
pries slightly more than other types of restaurants.
Our results for turnover and wage sums suggest no hanges in demand
for restaurant servies or employment in the setor. We nd that even those
restaurants whih did hange their pries the most did not experiene an
inrease in the number of restaurant meals sold. We also have graphial
evidene supporting the view that turnover follows the development of on-
sumer pries. In addition, we do not nd any eets on entry into or exit
out of the restaurant industry due to the reform.
These observations imply that the prie elastiity of demand (quantities)
is very small or even lose to zero. Our estimates are in line with the pa-
per by Kosonen (2010) studying the eet of a VAT ut on hairdressers in
Finland. Thus we onlude that onsumption tax reforms for labor-intensive
industries, even when as large as in this ase, are not very eient poliy
means for inreasing demand. Also, the job reation objetive of redued
VAT rates for labor-intensive industries (CD 1999/85/EC) is evidently not
fullled.
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All Firms with prie observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS All MaRa All MaRa Chain Prie hange
DD -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.005 -0.020 0.008 0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036)
MaRa* 0.025*** 0.056
DD (0.010) (0.035)
Chain* -0.051
DD (0.055)
Prie hange >5%* -0.063
DD (0.054)
N 26,963 26,963 4,146 4,146 4,146 4,146
R2 0.072 0.072 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.037
N of rms 3,402 3,402 543 543 543 543
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8: DD estimation results: Turnover
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of onsumer prie
turnover. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the whole data set of restaurants and
hotels, and olumns (3) to (6) present the results for those rms for whih we have prie
data around the reform. Column (1) presents the DD results, olumn (2) presents the
result where the DD variable is interated with whether the restaurant belongs to MaRa
or not, olumns (3) and (4) ontain the same estimates as in olumns (1) and (2) but only
for rms for whih we have prie data. In olumn (5) we interat the DD variable by a
dummy for belonging to a hain or not, and in olumn (6) for whether or not a restaurant
redued pries by over 5% after the reform. The standard errors are alulated by using
industry-level lusters with a blok bootstrapping method.
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All Firms with prie observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARS All MaRa All MaRa Chain Prie hange
DD -0.031 -0.042 -0.016 -0.032 -0.027 -0.051
(0.035) (0.037) (0.048) (0.061) (0.055) (0.058)
MaRa 0.029 0.037
(0.023) (0.066)
Chain 0.039
(0.065)
Prie hange 0.143
(0.094)
N 17,065 17,065 2,831 2,831 2,831 2,831
R2 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009
N of rms 2,563 2,563 440 440 440 440
Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: DD estimation results: Wage sums
Note: Fixed eets DD estimates where the dependent variable is the log of wage sums.
Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the whole data set of restaurants and hotels,
and olumns (3) to (6) present the results for those rms for whih we have prie data
around the reform. Column (1) presents the DD results, olumn (2) presents the result
where the DD variable is interated with whether a restaurant belongs to MaRa or not,
olumns (3) and (4) ontain the same estimates as olumns (1) and (2) but only for rms
for whih we have prie data. In olumn (5) we interat the DD variable with a dummy
for belonging to a hain or not, and in olumn (6) for whether or not a restaurant redued
pries by over 5% after the reform. The standard errors are alulated by using industry-
level lusters with a blok bootstrapping method.
42
Table A1: Desiptive statistis for CPI data from the statistis oes of
Sweden and Norway (in euros)
Sweden Norway
Variable Mean N Variable Mean N
Dinner1 42.41 84 Beef 8.95 36
Dinner2 32.28 63 Salmon 21.74 138
Dinner3 24.37 93 Salad 14.58 165
LunhA 9.70 115 Pizza 15.06 144
LunhB 10.34 59 Sandwih 5.97 202
Lunh Fish 14.26 49 Soup 11.15 92
Wine 29.31 117 Wine 8.91 310
Beer 6.32 117 Beer 8.05 220
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